What is confirmed

Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it fixed the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts and contacted customers. Its incident history marks the event resolved on 17 November.

Report URI independently scanned 1,611 Optimizely snippets and retained copies of 188 infected files belonging to 178 organisations. The researcher observed infected code being removed late on 16 November. This establishes a broad supply-chain compromise; it does not prove that every visitor to every named site executed every malicious function.

How the address swap worked

The payload searched for checksum-valid addresses on Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, Tron, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It could replace addresses in visible text, form inputs, links, images, clipboard operations and outgoing browser requests. A user could therefore copy what appeared to be the correct deposit address and still paste an attacker-controlled address.

Report URI traced about $7,040 of crypto into identified attacker wallets by 19:25 UTC on 16 November. That is a verified lower bound, not a final loss total. The same payload also contained payment-card skimming and iOS exploit-delivery functions, so the incident is wider than crypto theft.

Practical implications and actions

  1. If you sent crypto after copying an address from a website on 16 November, compare the destination recorded on-chain with the address supplied by the intended recipient through a separate trusted channel.
  2. Do not “test” a suspicious address with another transfer. Crypto transactions cannot be recalled.
  3. If a payment landed at the wrong address, contact the receiving exchange or service and law enforcement promptly with the transaction hash. Recovery is not guaranteed.
  4. If you entered card details on a site later confirmed as affected, monitor the account and follow the card issuer’s fraud guidance.
  5. Optimizely customers should review Project JavaScript, experiment code, account users, API tokens and integrations, then rotate credentials and preserve logs.

Risks and unknowns

Optimizely has not publicly identified every affected customer or published a complete root-cause report. Report URI could only scan snippets it found, so 178 is not necessarily the final count. The number of exposed visitors, copied addresses, payment cards and browser sessions is unknown. No evidence shows that Ledger hardware wallets or their secure elements were compromised; the reported path was malicious website JavaScript.

What to watch next

Watch for Optimizely’s detailed incident report, customer notifications that narrow exposure windows, a final stolen-funds tally and any confirmation of card or device compromise. Users should rely on direct notices from organisations they used, not unsolicited “recovery” messages.

EVIDENCE LEDGER

Sources you can open

01
Optimizely statusVendor confirmation, containment and resolution status.
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02
Report URI investigationCaptured snippets, timeline, payload analysis and wallets.
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03
ReutersIndependent reporting and affected-company responses.
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04
The Hacker NewsIndependent security reporting on the payload.
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Safety note

Anyone offering guaranteed recovery or asking for a seed phrase is attempting a second scam. A transaction hash is public; a seed phrase must remain private.