What Lighter says happened
Lighter says the affected accounts used signing code outside its official SDKs and repeated an ECDSA nonce. A nonce must be unique and unpredictable for every signature. Reusing one with the same key lets an observer calculate the private signing key from two public signatures.
The attacker then used the exposed API key to create a public pool from the victim account, mint pool shares from another account, move the victim’s funds into the pool and redeem the attacker-held shares. Lighter says an API key cannot send a normal withdrawal to a different wallet, but the public-pool route allowed value to be transferred indirectly.
Lighter now requires a wallet signature before funds can enter a public pool and no longer makes API-key signatures public. It says IP allowlists, per-key permissions and limits, and nonce-reuse monitoring are planned.
What is independently visible
Bitquery traced one withdrawal of 10,393,057 USDC from Lighter’s Ethereum contract at 10:11 UTC on November 16. The receiving wallet exchanged the USDC for ether and routed part of it through fresh wallets to Hyperliquid. This confirms a large on-chain withdrawal, but it does not independently prove every step inside Lighter’s off-chain and rollup systems.
Reports of roughly 15.5 million USDC across two accounts are not confirmed by Lighter. The company’s report says Guardian mode allowed about 5 million USDC to be returned to the affected trader, without publishing a full loss-and-recovery ledger.
Practical implications and actions for users and API traders
- Rotate every Lighter API key if custom or third-party signing code was used.
- Move to an official Lighter SDK—Python, Go, TypeScript or Agent Kit—or audit nonce generation with a cryptography specialist.
- Never derive a nonce from a timestamp, counter, message contents or weak random generator.
- Review pool creation, sub-account transfers, orders and leverage for activity you did not authorize.
- Ignore direct messages offering refunds or key checks. Use only Lighter’s verified channels.
Risks and unknowns
Lighter attributes the exposure to account-side signing code, but API permissions still allowed a compromised trading key to move value through a pool. The planned limits and IP controls are not all live yet. The total gross loss, net loss after recovery and identity of every affected account remain undisclosed.
What to watch next
Watch for a complete recovery ledger, rollout dates for IP allowlists and per-key permissions, disclosure of any other nonce-reuse cases, and confirmation that pending withdrawals finished processing. A reopened service is a recovery milestone, not proof that every affected trader is whole.
Sources you can open
01No support agent needs your seed phrase or raw API private key. Rotate credentials from the official product, not from a link sent in a message.